As seen in P.1 of this in depth investigation, Turks increasingly considered EU membership in instrumental terms. The transformation in AKP's position in support of the membership reflects an already ongoing transformation of the Islamist discourse on Europe from that of confrontation to that of cooperation, competition and expansion of opportunities. AKP's change of discourse on Europe also points to the fact that the Islamists have "succeeded in challenging the Kemalist equation of urban with modem and secular, and rural with backward and Islamic."45 Overall, Turkish conservatives tend to view Turkey's integration into Europe in a more positive light than do many secularists who are inclined to defend Turkey's sovereignty. However, the cultural conservatives of Europe are either skeptical or apprehensive about Turkey's entry into the EU. They view the European Union as a "civilizational project" rather than simply a project of coexistence of civilizations and thus question the place of Turkey within this project.
Relations with the United States: A Crisis Management
While Turkey's relations with the European Union under the AKP government went relatively smooth. the same can hardly be claimed in the case of relations with the United States. On the other dimension of Turkish-Western relations, the AKP government basically continued traditional Turkish foreign policy that dictates a close relationship with the United States. Some tensions during the Iraq War largely stemming from the refusal of the Turkish parliament to allow deployment of U.S. troops in Turkey could be attributed less to the ideology of the AKP than to the overall anxiety of the Turkish people and its political establishment about the U.S. foreign policy in recent years. In many regards, Turkey's relations with the United States in the first decades of the new century were similar to the 1960s and 1970s when the relations were strained because of the Cyprus conflict. Now the Iraq War and the ensuing alliance between the United States and Iraqi Kurds were the major factors to complicate relations between two allies.46 In Turkish security reading, the Iraq War led to negative consequences such as enhancing Iran's regional dominance, threatening the survival of the Turkish-speaking Turkoman population of Iraq, and more significantly putting strains on Turkish territorial integrity by allowing the PKK guerillas safe haven within Iraq away from previously regular Turkish military incursions. In the aftermath of the Iraq War, an anti-American mood in the Turkish public reached record levels in the context of increasing Kurdish terrorist activity that gained traction due to the alleged Iraqi Kurdish sheltering of the PKK. Turkish public opinion was cited by a number of polls as one of the most anti-American. In the 1999/2000 period, the favorable opinion of the United States in Turkey was 52%: it declined to 30 in 2002. 15 in 2003. and 12 in 2006.47 In the 1960s the incident that symbolically marked the straining Turkish-American relations was the Johnson Letter, sent in 1964 by U.S. President Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister Inonii to force him to cancel a military intervention plan in Cyprus. In the first decade of the twenty-first century it was "the bag incident" that took place in July 4,2003, when eleven Turkish special forces officers stationed in Siileymaniye, Iraq, were interrogated for sixty hours with bags over their head. The main cause of this recent tension was that the United States was allowing the PKK guerillas to station and grow in strength under the Northern Iraqi shelter.
One further note of comparison between the ideological atmosphere of the 1960s and that in the 2000s should be stated. In contrast to the 1960s and 1970s when anti-Americanism was largely a monopoly of the radical left, this time it was more widespread, particularly among the conservative Islamic segments of the population. While many key figures of the Turkish 1968-generationjoined liberal internationalism in the 1990s, Islamic movement experienced politicization under the Milli Goru identity,ending ideological monopoly of the left over the antiimperialist discourse. The AKP was criticized for allowing this happening because of provoking U.S. anger after rejecting a motion in the parliament to allow deployment of U.S. troops. Although parliament's decision reflected the Turkish public opinion, many who were in favor of the motion accused the AKP, particularly the then Prime Minister Abdullah Giil, of failing to demonstrate an efficient leadership. It appeared that the relations between Turkey and the United States were hardly able to recover from the shock of this incident. American authorities were annoyed with the inability of the AKP government to convince the parliament. In an interview on ABC television, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld openly blamed Turkey for the failure of the Iraq operation: "Had we been successful in getting the 4th Infantry Division to come in through Turkey... I believe that a considerably smaller number of the Baathists and the regime elements would have escaped... .And as a result the insurgency would have been at a lesser intensity than it is today...48
Paul Wolfowitz, who praised Turkish democracy on earlier occasions, suddenly started to speak against the parliament's decision. In an interview he gave to CNN- Turk, he stated that he was particularly disappointed with the low profile maintained by the Turkish military: "I think for whatever reason they did not play the strong leadership role... that we would have expected.'49 Before the critical voting held in the parliament, the Turkish National Security Council, famous for issuing "recommendations" to governments on a wide spectrum of issues, did not reveal its position. Democracy that the the United States claimed to be spreading in the Middle East had dire consequences. However, it should also be noted that the AKP government, particularly Prime Minister Erdogan and his close advisers, defended cooperation with the United States on Iraq, despite the negative public opinion in the country. Erdogan and his team were always very careful to be seen as cooperative with the United States. In December 2002 before assuming the power, Erdogan visited the U.S. capital and met President Bush where he allegedly agreed to American demands regarding the Iraqi crisis in exchange for endorsement of his government. Erdogan was received in the Oval Office for the second time in 2004. It should be noted, however, that American foreign policy under the Bush administration has alienated not only the Islamists but also many secularists. The CHP, as the main opposition party in the parliament, opposed the stationing of American troops on Turkish territory and voted for its rejection. The major Kemalist daily, Cumhuriyet, was fiercely critical of the AKP government because of the alleged concessions given by the government to the United States. President Sezer himself publicly opposed the Iraq War because of a lack of international legitimacy. The only supporters of the United States in the Turkish media were a marginal group of liberal columnists and some advisors of Erdogan, reportedly excluding Ahmet Davutoglu. There were also more realist commentators who, while believing that Iraq War was wrong, maintained that in order for Turkey to gain power over the future of Iraq, it was necessary to support the United States. Overall, it would be a justifiable claim to argue that the AKP government succeeded to manage relations with the United States without bringing in its assumed ideological baggage of anti-Americanism. In this regard, the AKP's emphasis on relations with the United States can be regarded as contradictory to the party ideology. However, in the larger context of foreign policy outlook of the Turkish Islamic movement, particularly that of the social Islamic movements, which have historically regarded relations with the West as balancing the domestic secularist circles, one can argue that the AKP has followed the conventional position of social Islamic groups on relations with the United States. On the contrary, the government was closer to the United States than the domestic secularist opposition and arguably the secularist political establishment.
Meanwhile, the AKP government also searched for regional cooperation particularly with regard to the Iraq crisis. Under Abdullah Giil's premiership, Turkey organized a regional meeting of foreign ministers in Istanbul in January 23, 2003, with the participation of six key Middle Eastern powers, including Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. Turkey initially proposed a summit meeting of heads of state, but faced with the opposition ofthe Arab leaders, the summit was downgraded to a meeting of foreign ministers. 50 However, the regional foreign ministers meetings continued. The AKP government seemed to have watered down its efforts to seek a regional solution to the Iraq problem in the wake of the Bush administration's insistence on war despite encouraging opposition from the European allies. Having failed to prevent the war, the AKP government started to offer technical support to the United States such as allowing air passage to U.S. warplanes. In the meantime, Erdogan shied away from visiting neighboring Muslim countries in an attempt not to harm relations with the United States. He cancelled a scheduled visit to Iran, bowing to pressures from domestic groups as well as the energetic U.S. Ambassador Eric Edelman.51 While Erdogan visited Malaysia and more recently the Central Asian republics in an effort to boost Turkish interests in the region, the AKP government has kept an extremely low profile with regard to relations with the Muslim world, particularly in comparison with Erbakan' s active pursuit of close links with Muslim countries, which led to the establishment of a Muslim development organization, D-8. The only exception to this was the election of a Turkish diplomat, Ekmeleddin Thsanoglu, as the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference. ihsanoglu, who had a previous academic career, was elected as the Secretary General of OIC in a competition with Malaysian and Bangladeshi candidates, obtaining thirty-two as opposed to twelve votes cast for Malaysia and Bangladesh. Quite significantly Turkey was able to gain support of Arab states, indicating improving relations with the Arab world. ihsanoglu was presented by Turkey as a reform candidate who could bring changes to the organization and initiate debates on democracy in the wider Muslim world. However, this was a significant but largely symbolic move, and it did not suggest that the AKP was turning its face to the Muslim world at the expense of relations with the West. Overall, relations with the West have remained the priority of the AKP government.
In October 2003, the Turkish parliament passed a resolution that would allow the government to send troops to Iraq in support of the Occupation forces despite the massive public opposition. The government was apparently trying to obtain a foothold in Northern Iraq and mend relations with the United States after the parliament's rejection of U.S. deployment of troops through Turkish territory. Alth.ough the United States supported the presence of Turkish troops in Iraq,52 the idea never materialized because of opposition of the Iraqi government. However, Turkey's willingness to become a part of a Western occupation force in a Muslim country had significant implications. This was the most interesting demonstration of the transfarmation of the party's political identity. The Islamist media were very critical .of this decisian, as reflected an the opinion pieces that appeared in the pro-government Yeni $afak. The secularist press, particularly the pro American liberal calumnists such as Cengiz-andar and Ctineyt Ulsever, were supportive. The decision to participate in the accupatian of Iraq as the only Muslim country represented an identity shift as it demonstrated Turkey's orientalization of lraq. AKP government was willing t.o participate in a Western-led occupation of Iraq against its neighbor Turkey's relations with Israel, however, entered into a period. of crisis during AKP's tenure in power.
In 2002, a strategic alliance between Turkey, Israel, and India or a "triple entente" was being cooked among some intellectual circles in the United States.53 The Turkish-Israeli relat.ons had already obtained a strategic nature since the February 28 process that ousted the Erbakan gavernment. However, when a single-party AKP government emerged in the 2002 general electians, one of the critical issues many domestic and internatianal observers were curious abaut was how the new government would tackle the question of Israel.
In his visit to Washington in 2002, Erdogan met with representatives of Israeli lobby in the United States and vowed to improve palitical and economic relations between Turkey and Israel.54 However, relations suffered a blow when Erdogan called Israel a "terrorist state" during a meeting with an Israeli minister in Ankara after Israel's targeted assassinations of a number of key Hamas leaders. Erdogan stated that "the current Sharon administration takes decisions to kill individuals. And they declare that this will continue. Unless this [policy] changes, we can never bring peace to the Middle East." Erdogan refused to accept an invitation to Israel. On May 26, 2004, when Turkey called its ambassador in Israel home for consultations, many commented that the "strategic alliance" was in a period of serious crisis. A key question here is whether the AKP's Islamist identity has shaped this erosion in relations with Israel. The neoconservative lobbies in the United States believe so and have targeted the AKP for a change of foreign policy orientation in Turkey. For instance, Michael Rubin, a resident scholar in the American Enterprise Institute commented: There has been a profound shift in Turkish foreign policy. The ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi [AKP] has sought to reorient Turkish policy away ITom the United States, toward both Europe and the Islamic world. Turkey's press, much of which makes the BBC look levelheaded and unbiased, happily cooperated. The first victim of Turkey's shifting diplomacy has been Israel.55
It should however also be pointed out that Erdogan's statement did not receive any response from the domestic sources of power, including the military, who previously pressured Erbakan's Refahyol government to sign a number of significant military contracts with Israel in 1997. It appeared that the political establishment at large as a result of their increased worries about the changing geopolitical climate in the Middle East and Israel's alleged role in Northern Iraq, endorsed the AKP government's position on Israel. There were indications that the Turkish military came to view its alliance with Israel as not very profitable. There was widespread disappointment in Turkey over Israel's insistence to stay neutral in the 1998 crisis with Syria over the issue of extradition of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, and Israel's perceived general lack of cooperation over the Kurdish issue. It was also reported that the Turkish military was unhappy about the result of its military agreements with Israel because of the delays and unmet commitments in M-60 tank and F-4 warplane modernization agreements.56 Meanwhile, former Admiral ilhami Erdil, who played a key role in military cooperation with Israel as the commander of the Turkish navy between 1999 and 2002, was found guilty of major irregularities by a military court in Turkey in an unrelated case. Consequently the fanner officer was stripped of his admiral title. None of these, however, disappointed the Turkish military establishment as much as the new geopolitical context in the Middle East as a result of the Iraq War. The war was supported by Israel to the dislike of Turkey. Turks were particularly suspicious of Israeli relations with Iraqi Kurds. Israel's relations with Kurds predated the war. The Iraqi Kurdish leader, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, father of Kurd is tan Democratic Party leader Mesut Barzani, visited Israel in 1967 and 1973. In the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Kurds opened an internal front against the Iraqi forces, preventing Iraq from offering aid to other Arab states. In 1973, another request from Israel to Barzani to mount a new offensive was reportedly blocked by the CIA and Henry Kissenger.57 In the 1980s, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin proclaimed that Israel sent to the Kurds not only humanitarian aid but also military advisors. Kurds, who live in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran as minorities were perceived by Israel as a natural ally in the region. Israel's logic is strategic because "by aligning with the Kurds, Israel gains eyes and ears in Iran, Iraq and Syria.“58
Even at the height of strategic relations with Turkey, Israel never committed itself to any cooperation that would jeopardize its relations with the Kurds. As noted by defense analyst Sariibrahimoglu, Israel has signed several agreements with Turkey in the field of military as well as trade relations. It has always been cautious, however, not to sign any agreement concerning the fight against Turkish terrorist organizations, including the PKK.. . .Israel, already a state targeted by a long list ofterrorist organizations in the Middle East, does not want to make Turkish Hizbullah or the PKK Israel's enemies. 59
These relations have deepened following the Iraq War. 'When The New Yorker journalist Seymour M. Hersh reported the Israeli activities in Iraq, it was immediately translated into Turkish and widely discussed. In that piece, Hersh claims that Israeli intelligence and military operatives are now quietly at work in Kurdistan, providing training for Kurdish commando units and, most important in Israel's view, running covert operations inside Kurdish areas of Iran and Syria. Israel feels particularly threatened by Iran, whose position in the region has been strengthened by the war. The Israeli operatives include members of the Mossad, Israel's clandestine foreign-intelligence service, who work undercover in Kurdistan as businessmen and, in some cases, do not carry Israeli passports.60
As quoted by Hersh, a former Israeli intelligence officer acknowledges that "since late 2003 Israel had been training Kurdish commando units to operate in the same manner and with the same effectiveness as Israel's most secretive commando units, the Mistaravim."61 Turkish officials see this development as "very dangerous for us, and for them, too. We do not want to see Iraq divided, and we will not ignore it."62 Turks were also worried about the alleged purchase of property in Northern Iraq by Israeli citizens. Hersh reports that another senior Turkish official explained that the Turkish government discussed its worries about the Israeli military activities in Northern Iraq with the Israeli Foreign Ministry, but "they deny the training and the purchase of property and claim it's not official but done by private persons. Obviously, our intelligence community is aware that it was not so. This policy is not good for America, Iraq, or Israel and the Jews."63 The Iraq War shattered the traditional interpretation of the Turkish political establishment which relied on relations with Israel against Arab regimes who were believed to have supported the Kurdish guerilla activities in Turkey. In the Turkish interpretation, the war empowered the Kurds in Iraq and subsequently the Iraqi territorial integrity is in risk. The PKK activities that were almost completely suppressed by the end of 1990‘s have increased. In this new geopolitical context, Turkey moved closer to Syria in an attempt to balance against the increasing power of the Iraqi Kurds. This led to the shattering of the anti-Syrian Turkish-Israeli alliance that was built in order to pressure Syrians to give up their support to PKK guerillas. This policy change appears to have been widely supported and approved by the Turkish political establishment.
In February 2006, a Hamas delegate headed by Khaled Meshaal visited Ankara and met several foreign ministry bureaucrats and AKP officials, including deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gill. The Turkish media and the main opposition party, CHP, attacked the government for making a grave mistake for Turkish relations with Israel and the West. Israel brusquely criticized the visit and asked what would Turkey have felt if Israel had invited the PKK, a comparison which the Turkish strongly reacted to. On the other hand, the United States avoided any direct criticism of this visit, emphasizing that what was more important was the message given to Hamas itself. From an American perspective, Hamas constituted a dilemma as an Islamist and violent movement which came to power through U.S.-promoted democratic elections. It was possibly a consideration for the United States that Turkey, a close ally of the United States, could bring Hamas closer to the West and prevent its moving closer to Iran and Russia, two powers which did not recognize Hamas as a terrorist movement and extended an invitation to Hamas. The domestic and pro-Israeli sources in the United States, however, pointed out that the AKP foreign policy planners, most specifically Abmet Davutoglu, was responsible for the Hamas invitation.64 However, it should be noted that the Turkish military, which was otherwise vocal on critical foreign policy issues implicitly approved the Hamas visit. According to Fikret Bilal, a prominent Milliyet columnist known as close to military sources, the visit was planned jointly by the prime minister, the foreign ministry, security and intelligence units.65 Similarly, the True Path party leader, Mehmet Agar, who came from inside the political establishment supported the opening of relations with Hamas. However, it can also be argued that the structural changes that occurred in the aftermath of the Iraq War allowed the AKP to implement its desired foreign policy orientation in establishing closer ties with the Muslim Middle East at the expense of relations with Israel. In this regard, interests and identity seem to be very much intertwined. In that regard, AKP's implementation of its own agenda in foreign policy found a much more favorable structural context than what was available to the Welfare Party under Erbakan. The Turkish political establishment considers the AKP a party rooted in political Islam and hence sees the AKP government as advantageous to enhance relations with the Middle East. As one foreign ministry bureaucrat suggested, it was beneficial for Turkey to have the AKP in power at a critical juncture for the Middle East, because the AKP's identity fit these new policy changes.66 However, the AKP has allowed itself to be targeted by pro-Israeli sources as responsible for shifting Turkey's traditional foreign policy orientation even though these policies reflect a much wider consensus. All political actors in Turkey have been quite aware of the fact that the Israel question for Turkey cannot be reduced to Israel's regional policies only. The relationship was significant because of the Israeli lobby's perceived influence in the United States.67 It was reported that these circles exerted heavy pressure on the government through media campaigns and think tank reports.68 Hence maintenance of close relations with such circles is critical not only for international politics but also for domestic interests of identity actors. The government's eagerness to move closer to Europe is seen as an attempt to balance the Israeli-American alliance in the Middle East. Europe's increasing ambiguity in granting Turkey full membership leads to a new thinking among some AKP policy elites, who realize the significance of relations with the United States and Israel.
Ironically, when Erdogan asked for an official visit to the White House, it would not materialize for him before paying a visit to Israel in May 2005. As Michael Rubin maintains, "lfthe AKP gambles established triendships for the ephemeral promises of Iran, the Arab world, and Europe, it may find itself uncomfortably alone. That is a risk Erdogan should not take. ,,69 The government had to face severe criticism trom the neoconservative press in the United States on its change of policy. On the more recent issue of Ham as invitation to Ankara, the WINEP Turkey specialist Soner Cagaptay takes on the AKP for risking Turkey's relations with the West and its allies in the Middle East. 70 In this context. the AKP government as well as the Turkish political establishment knows that relations with the United States and indirectly with Israel cannot be risked for the sake of an uncertain future in the European Union. On the other hand, on many critical issues such as Iran and the Palestinian crisis, differences between the United States and Europe seem to be narrowing. The issue of Iran is particularly critical for Turkey. As a regional competitor of Iran, Turkey does not wish to see an Iran with nuclear weapons. However, Iran is a neighbor of Turkey with a long history of stability in relations. Turkey recognizes Iran's right to nuclear power for civilian use, partly because it also sees itself for aspiring nuclear technology in the near future. On the other hand, Turkey does not want to see Iran obtaining nuclear weapons capability, which would disrupt the power balance between the two countries. Hence the Iran issue represents another challenge for Turkish relations with the regional powers and the United States. Although Abdullah Gul has ruled out the possibility that Turkey would allow use of its territory in case of an external attack against Iran, it will test the AKP's resolution to pursue a "zero-problem" relationship with its neighbors.
As we have seen before, after the end ofthe Cold War, the leftist Kemalism suffered a split after a number of intellectuals left the group to join Ozal's wave of globalism. The old guards, however, continued voicing leftist and nationalist ideas marked by a clear opposition to the process of globalization, antiimperialism, and increasingly the process of European integration. The leading intellectual figures of nationalist Kemalism included Mumtaz Soysal, ilhan Selyuk, Ilhami Soysal, and political cartoonist Turhan Selyuk. These names were also key members of the Yon movement in the 1960s. Like the Yon movement, they maintained ideological commitment to Kemalism and supported the CHP as the major political party. However, their opposition to the EU membership appears to be much more vocal than that of the CHP. A more radical and militarist form ofleftist Kemalism is maintained by the Turkish Workers Party (Tip) led by Dogu Perinyek and its main organ, Aydmhk magazine. These circles are currently known as ulusalcllzk, which implies secularist nationalism as opposed to milliyet9ilik, which connotes conservative nationalism. As a recent phenomenon in Turkish politics, some extreme ulusalcl circles have begun to organize themselves as underground militarist groups. Their strength is expected to increase if Turkish negotiations with the European Union fail to end in less than a full membership. The nationalist Kemalist opposition to the EU is cognitive rather than material, rooted in the way they perceive the Turkish security environment; they imagine threats to Turkey's national security. These perceptions are shaped by historical experiences with some of the European powers that designed the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and finally divided the Anatolian center of Turkey into several occupation zones and plotted to create independent Kurdish and Armenian states under the Treaty of Sevres. The perpetual fear that this scenario would be repeated operates strongly in the Turkish nationalist consciousness. A close analysis ofthe writings ofleading Kemalist intellectuals and politicians and statements of high-ranking military officers suggests that this image of a conspiratorial West bent on the destruction of the Turkish national integrity with the collabarotion of "intemal enemies" continues to exert a strong influence on their foreign-policy mentality.71 In the words of Hasan Pulur, a veteran Kemalist columnist in Milliyet, "The West and their internal collaborators, who have not forgotten the Sevres in history's dust bin, associate human rights with the Kurdish question, as if human-rights abuses are only directed against citizens of Kurdish origin.“72
The ulusalcl Kemalist discourse often quote Atatlirk's description of national sovereignty as a notion that "does not accept sharing in any meaning, form, color and appearance." In this Kemalist discourse, globalization and European integration are viewed as processes that erode the nation-state and sovereignty. Dogu Perinyek voices such concerns: Once you decide to enter the European Union, your capital becomes Brussels; your parliament and your government will be located there. If relinquishing the Turkish parliament, [the national capital city] Ankara, national industry and agriculture, Turkish lira and dismantling Kemalist revolutions is a "dishonor," then there is no honorable entry to the EU.73 In addition to European integration, globalization as a process of global integration is also viewed suspiciously by secularist circles. In the words of Chief of Staff General Ya‘ar Bilyiikanlt, "We can foresee today that the political side of globalization can bring more harm than good through eroding the concepts of nation-state and sovereignty.“74 It should be note that, on a number of key points, ulusa1cl discourse suffers from a number of contradictions. Their employment of a religiously and culturally charged discourse against the West runs counter to their strict adherence to secularism in domestic politics. In a striking case, former General ~imsek described the EU as a Christian club whose system of values and way oflife is shaped by Christian beliefs under the Vatican's influence.75 This was the first time the EU process was being described by a military general through the same vocabulary typically employed by the Islamist Necmettin Erbakan before its transformation to a supportive stance on the issue. Similarly, in 2002,General Tuncer Klhnci, former secretary of the National Security Council, suggested that as Europe looked negatively to Turkish national interests, Turkish foreign policy should explore the possibility of strengthening ties with Russia and Iran.76 This was an interesting twist of positions as one of the items included in the 28 February (1997) Manifesto presented by the National Security Council to then Prime Minister Erbakan included criticism of his alleged deepening relations with Iran. Among others, what would best illustrate the Kemalist religious and culturalist discourse is two political cartoons by the veteran Kemalist cartoonist Turhan Selyuk. Selyuk drew the European Union as.a mother pig nursing numerous baby pigs, while the lone Turkish lamb waits aside desperately hungry and isolated, suggesting the existence of strong and irreconcilable cultural differences between Europe and Turkey.77 No matter how badly Turks want to drink from the European milk, they cannot have it. Europe as the pig image essentially stems from a religious imagery of difference; it reflects a religiously charged folk description of Europe as a pig, the untouchable of Muslim cultural identity. Pig is depicted as dirty (nee is) which needs to be stayed away from.78
In another example, Turhan Selyuk depicted the Islamist support for the EU membership in the form of a headscarf-wearing girl carrying a pig's head and turning her face to the EU logo. In light of the cartoonist's initial depiction of an essential cultural difference between Turkey and Europe, his purpose here appears to criticize transformation of Islamism in Turkey toward the idea of supporting the EU membership as a cultural deformation or as a process of piginization. In this process, one loses hislher cultural authenticity and becomes similar to hislher cultural Other, which is Europe as the cultural Other of Turkish identity.79 The leftist Kemalists explicitly oppose EU membership. However, the CHP as the main political force in the Kemalist front evade an explicit opposition but rather oppose the conditions imposed by the European integration process. Ulusalcl Kemalists joined their power with other nationalists including their former foe, the MHP of the Grey Wolves and some anti-ED Islamists within the Erbakan led SP, in the right to fonn Klzllelma Koalisyonu (the coalition of the Red Apple) named after the famous poem of Ziya Gokalp, KIZII Elma. The democratization process within the framework of membership as implemented by the ruling AKP is described by these circles as submission to foreign forces, demolition of national integrity, betrayal of the Cyprus cause, and cultural assimilation. While the group may appear as marginal, they have a certain following in influential political centers. It is also interesting to note that the main intellectual leader of this movement, ilhan Selauk, maintains a close friendship with President Necdet Sezer who reportedly hold with him regular consultative meetings.80 Selauk is criticized by a fonner colleague of his, Hasan Cemal, as defending a fascist regime: "Selauk defends [the pan- Turkist ideal of] Turan and opens door to an extraordinary degree of nationalism. He demands intervention of the military. He is afraid of the EU and further democratization of the country. This amounts to a defense of a fascist regime."81
The discourse accuses conservative Muslim groups, including the AKP and the Gillen movement, of being in a common plot with the Western power center, particularly Washington. in order to undennine the secular essentials of the Kemalist regime.82 However, they do not wish to come to tenns with the fact that it was Washington who endorsed or at least did not object to the military coups in Turkey, including their favorite 1960 Coup.83 As an unchanging characteristic of the leftist Kemalists since the Yon movement, they applaud military interventions in Turkish politics and take on generals who appear as uninterested in playing a political role. Despite their discourse of populism and socialism, they explicitly dislike the popular will of the people as reflected through elections and support militarism. A further contradiction of the leftist Kemalism is that while presenting themselves as forces of progress, they eulogize the 1930s as their idealized period in Turkish history and long for a return to that period, that would mean a return to one-party rule and strict application of radical secularism.
Liberal Globalism
Liberal globalists perceive Turkey as part of the West and believe that Turkey should be strongly integrated in all Western integration processes. Liberal globalists share a general Kemalist perspective that modernization equals Westernization and the process of modernization would be best consolidated through Western political institutions and integration to a global liberal economic system. As Tanll Bora suggests,
the civilizationist discourse of liberal nationalism considers liberal market economy perfectly in tune with the ideal of "attaining the rank of modern civilization" inherited from Atatiirkism and defines a cultural identity in terms of its ability to "achieve" and "catch up with" the modern lifestyle.84
Again one of the best illustrations ofthis perspective is a political cartoon that depicted the transformation of Turkish Islamists embracing EU membership goal in the form of steps in biological evolution. In an illustration that appeared anonymously in the liberal daily Radikal accompanying an essay on the transformation of an Islamist view in the process of European integration, a monkey-shaped, traditionally dressed, heavily bearded, radical Islamist walks through the steps of evolution and fmally evolves into modem looking, Western-dressed, EU-embracing person that looks like Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan.85 Apparently in the imagination of the newspaper, the EU represented as the final step in the evolutionary process, and support for the EU represented a higher, culturally superior form of evolution. As opposed to how ulusa1cl Kemalist Turhan Seluk sees it, the cartoonist accepts the EU as a civilizing process for Turkey's "culturally backward" Muslims. In the view ofliberal globalism, the EU membership represents an elevation of Turkey's civilizational standard and thus it is a civilizing process. In contrast to the ulusalcl discourse, liberals do not see full membership in the EU as contradictory to Atatiirk's principle of nationalism but rather see it as an evolution of his goal of making Turkey an equal member of the family of European nations, which cannot be achieved, in their view, without full EU membership. Liberal globalism was politically hegemonic during the 1980s and 1990s under Turgut Ozal, who managed to convince a number of leftist intellectuals that leftist ideology has ended and it was now the time of globalization. With Ozal' s death in 1993, liberal globalism was relegated to a defensive position largely contained to intellectual activitity, as Turkey returned to the status quo conservatism of leaders such as Stileyman Demirel and Mesut Yllmaz, statist nationalism of the CRP, and Islamic conservatism of Erbakan. The closest position taken to liberal globalism has been that of the AKP, but the AKP has adopted a completely different discourse on civilizational identity, which liberal globalists came to dislike. The AKP has reshaped liberal globalist discourse with an authentic civilizational discourse. However, liberal globalists do not accept this refonnulation as liberal and sufficiently Western-oriented, because for them the center of civilization is the West and they see Turkey's place as in the West. They largely believe that the AKP pursues pro EU policies largely as a cover to shift Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East. Hence what appears essential for them is that Turkey maintains its unidirectional foreign policy and Western civilization orientation. For instance, Cengiz Candar, a key figure in liberal globalist movement and the fonner advisor to Turgut Czal, finnly opposes AKP's attempt to redefine relations with Europe by asserting Turkey's civilizational authenticity: When, every now and then, you talk about an "Alliance of Civilizations" and claim that "I can bring about [such an alliance]," everyone will [eventually] ask you: "Who are you? Are you speaking as a Western country from inside the [Western] family, or are you on the other side of the fence, and you are saying, "one of my feet is with you [in the West], but my body and soul belong to the Islamic world?" [The AKP] is displaying the second option. When they talk about "alliance of civilizations," they are assuming the role of an ambassador or an advocate ofIslam to the West. With this attitude, in the new architecture of the world, they cannot succeed. Only a Western Turkey can influence the Islamic world. 86
It is important to note that there is no single line of liberal globalism in Turkish intellectual discourse on foreign policy. One can talk about two distinct currents within the liberal internationalist discourse: pro-American and pro-European. Pro-American liberals explicitly state their conviction about the process of U.S.-guided democratization in the Middle East, whereas pro-European liberals are highly critical of U.S. policies. Although both Pro-American and pro-European liberals support Turkey's EU membership, they equally subscribe to a discourse that the EU process is the culmination of Turkey's process Westernization to attain contemporary civilization. In tenns of their ideological background, most pro-American liberals are former members ofthe leftist Kemalist movement, whereas many pro-European liberals are former conservatives.Pro-American liberalism is represented by a number of intellectuals, most specifically Cengiz Candar, Mehmet Ali Birand, and Ciineyt Ulsever. While still adhering an ideological affinity with secularism, these names opposed the February 28 process. Candar and Birand were victims of a media propaganda against them and expelled from their newspapers because of false accusations of having contacts with the PKK. Pro-American liberals espouse a view that Turkey should continue firmly attached to the alliance system with the United States and do what is required in such a relationship, particularly as regards Middle East politics.Like many others in this group, Cengiz Candar is a member of the radical leftist movement, having served as the student leader of the Faculty of Politics (formerly Miilkiye) of Ankara University and as the editor of the Maoist Proleter Devrimci Aydmlzk published by Dogu Perinjek. He was charged in the 1971 coup and went abroad to escape persecution. He lived in Damascus and Beirut in proximity to the Palestinian movements and then went to Europe. Benefitting from a general amnesty, he returned to Turkey in 1974.87
In the 1980s, Candar was a sympathizer of the Iranian revolution. In the 1990s, he became Czal's foreign policy advisor and under his influence he came to embrace globalism and neo-Ottomanism. During the Febraruy 28 process, Candar developed an antimilitarist stance. In 1997, Candar and Mehmet Ali Birand were victims of a plot organized jointly by the military junta and the media including the newspapers Sabah and Milliyet for which they worked as columnists. At this point, he started to write for Yeni $afak, a daily close to the AKP circles. After the events of September 11, 2001, Candar left Yeni $afak questioning Islamists' lack of apology for the September 11 terrorism, which he labeled as "a moral paradox of Muslims": "Instead of an energetic stance that rejects the link between Islam and terrorism, [the Islamists] tried to locate America on 'the seat of the indicted'. It is not possible to understand in what way this [behavior] will benefit Turks and other Muslims.“88 Candar's assertions and his energetic support to the war on Afghanistan were rejected by other columnists in Yeni $afak who asserted that some Turks behaved more American than Americans themselves.89 From this time on, Candar together with a few other journalists began to defend the Bush administration's foreign policy even when it clashed with the interests of his former causes, namely, Palestine and Iran. Many liberal internationalists do not accept Candar as a representative of liberalism. However, he is a representative of a pro-American liberalism sui generis. Candar escapes ITom any criticism of the United States despite the increasing mood of anti-Americanism in Turkey.
Another vocal member of this group is Cuneyt Ulsever who shares a radical leftist background with Candar. In his regular columns in Hiirriyet he seeks to control damage in relations with the United States and to remind the AKP government of the importance of such relations for both its own power in the country and Turkish interests.90 Ulsever has actively campaigned for convincing the policymakers that Turkish support of the United States in the case of Iraq as well as in its conflict with Iran was essential for Turkish-American relations in the future.91 His American-informed perspective occasionally has gone to extreme limits in considering China as a major threat to Turkey.92 In the Hizbullah-Israel conflict in July and August 2006 pro-American liberals assumed an explicitly pro-Israeli stance in an interesting twist of positions for former advocates of the Palestinian cause in Turkey. Candar, who made his fame on the issue through his 1976 book titled Direnen Filistin (Palestine in Resistence), believed that Israel's power was undefeatable.93 Another member of the group Ciineyt Ulsever, who also comes from a radical leftist background, defended Israeli position on the crisis and justified its actions such as the Kana village massacre that was condemned worldwide:
When we turn our ear to Israeli claims, we hear that Hizbullah launched most of the [rockets] against Israel from this village, Hizbullah deployed its guerillas inside this village, built military barriers inside village houses, and the villagers were warned in advance about this situation. Are these claims correct or are Israelis telling lies? I believe in [the truth] ofIsraeli claims.94
Pro-American
liberals constitute a small but vocal group within the liberal globalist
movement. While they do not have a political party support, they nevertheless
participate and influence political debates on significant foreign policy
issues.
Conclusion
of this two part; Turkey Contested Foreign Policy research.
The Turkish political establishment under the influence of the military was not prepared to concede Welfare victory and attempted to deny the party government for about a year. Yet YIlmaz-Ciller disagreement caused the collapse of their weak coalition government in 1996, opening the way for Erbakan to form a coalition government with Ciller. Erbakan became the first Islamist prime minister of the country. Tolerating the government less than one year, the military exerted a massive pressure against the government and caused its collapse in 1997 through what came to be known as the 28 February process which was characterized by further state control of religious affairs and radical secularism. The Welfare Party was closed down, and Erbakan and his close friends in the party were banned from politics. However, this only allowed a younger generation ofleaders within the party who failed to end Erbakan's dominance to separate and establish the AKP on the basis of an ideological program that claimed the conservative-liberal legacy of the Menderes-Ozalline. Between 1997 and 2002, Turkey was ruled by Yllmaz and then the Ecevit-Ied coalition governments. This was a period characterized by political instability, allowing the military to reassert their control overpolitics, to reverse the process of civilianization of Turkish politics under the Ozal era.
However, under the leadership of charismatic Tayyip Erdogan, the Islamic conservative AKP swept the 2002 elections and formed a single-party government that was the first since two ANAP single-party governments under Ozal. However, as we have seen in P.1, the essential characteristic of the AKP foreign policy was its ardent support to the process of the EU membership. This was the first Islamically oriented party with such a clear support to the process. In a complete reversal of Turkish ideologies, Islamism under the AKP began to support EU membership, while nationalist Kemalists with a unique ideology of ulusa1clhk became its staunch opponents. One reason for this support was a lack of feeling secure felt by the AKP leadership within the domestic system due to the pressure exerted by the secularist system. The EU process was seen as a democratizing process. However, the other, perhaps more important, reason was a renewed sense of confidence felt by the Muslim conservative circles in the European integration process, particularly after redefining the process as a meeting of civilizations. The AKP sought to redefine Turkish-European relations on a new civilizational paradigm by asserting the authenticity of Turkish Islamic civilization. It is important to note that a more genuinely Western-oriented liberal globalist perspective rejects this civilizational redefinition and regards AKP's pro-EU stance as a camouflage to cover the party's attempt to maneuver Turkish foreign policy orientation toward the East.
Hence the ideational context in which Turkish foreign policy decisions take place is shaped by debates among Islamist (conservative globalist and anti-Western), the nationalist alliance of the Kemalist and conservative nationalists, and liberal globalist discourses. Among these the conservative globalist Islamist line represented politically by the AKP and the powerful movement of Fethullah Gillen appears to be hegemonic. However, two factors have the potential to change the political weight of these ideologies: the ambiguity surrounding the real prospects of Turkish membership in the EU and the Middle East politics of the United States. The decreasing support of the EU in more recent polls and the record level of anti-Americanism as reflected in recent polls in Turkey show that in the near future nationalist tendencies have the most potential to emerge as politically powerful. Ironically, however, the AKP's chance is that it can easily maneuver both the liberal wave and the antiliberal wave to its advantage because of its Islamist ideological background. In the same token, regardless of its actual anti-EU and anti-U.S. position, Kemalist nationalists as the quintessential Westernist force in Turkish domestic politics face more genuine risks at the face of European rejection of Turkey.
Update Oct.13 2007: Turkey should avoid any major military action in northern Iraq, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said today (Oct. 13). The statement comes ahead of Rice and U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Eric Edelman's visit to Turkey, where the government is asking parliament to approve a major operation against Kurdistan Workers' Party militants. An unnamed Turkish diplomat told Reuters that the major issue for the U.S. officials' visit is a recently passed U.S. House resolution recognizing the 1915 killings of Armenians as genocide. We in turn are currently preparing a two part article that investigates, is able to explain (as this has not been done yet), ‘the why’ of Turkey’s contested national identity and foreign policy. We expect to complete this in three days.
Notes Part 2 of Turkey's Contested Foreign Policy:
46 For a detailed analysis of AKP government's handling of the Iraq War, see Saban Karda~, "Turkey and the Iraqi Crisis: IDP between Identity and Interest," in The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the Ak Parti, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006).
47 "America's Image Slips, But Allies Share US Concerns Over Iran, Hamas: IS-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey," The Pew Global Attitudes Project, Washington DC, June 13, 2006.
48 "US Blames Turkey for Iraq Chaos," Los Angeles Times, March 22, 2005.
49 "Wolfowitz Criticizes Turkey for not Supporting US Against Iraq," Boston Globe, May 06, 2003.
50 "Turkey's Iraq plan snubbed by Arabs," the Times (London), January 23, 2003.
51 "Sakm iran'a Gitme!," Milliyet, September 16,2003.
52 "US Welcomes Turkish Parliament's Decision to Send Troops to Iraq," U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, Tuesday, October 7, 2003.
53 Ilan Berman, "Israel, India and Turkey: Triple Entente?" Middle East Quarterly 9, no. 4 (2002).
54 "Turkish leader stresses strong ties with Israel in meeting with U.S. Jews," http://www.theturkishtimes.com/archive/03/01 03/Cties.html (February 12, 2006).
55 Michael Rubin, "Shifting Sides? The problems ofneo-Ottomanism," National Review, August 10,2004.
56 Jonathan Gorvett, "Israel Defence Deal Irks Turkey," February 06, 2005, http://english.alj azeera.netlNR/exeres/8CD 13 6DA - F056-4D I A - AA4D4D2712419ABF.htm (accessed: February 13,2006).
57 Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services, 1st American ed. (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991),329.
58 Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command : The Roadfrom 9/11 to Abu Ghraib, 1st ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 357.
59 Lale Sariibrahimoglu, Turkish Daily News, February 23, 2000.
60 Seymour M. Hersh, "Plan B," New Yorker, June 28, 2004.
61 Hersh, Chain o/Command: The Road/rom 9/11 to Abu Ghraib, 357.
62 Seymour M. Hersh, "Plan B," New Yorker, June 28, 2004.
63 Seymour M. Hersh, "Plan B," New Yorker, June 28,2004.
64 "Altmdan Ociktl," Hilrriyet, February 18,2006.
65 Fikret Bila, "Hamas Ziyaretinin Perde Arkasi," Milliyet, February 18,2006.
66 Anonymous source.
67 For this view, see John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "The IsraefLobby," London Review o/Books 28, no. 6 (2006), and Mearsheimer and Walt, "The Israel Lobby and U.s. Foreign Policy."
68 Yasemin Congar, "AKP'ye Dort Mesaj," Milliyet, May 12,2005.
69 Michael Rubin, "Shifting Sides? The problems ofneo-Ottomanism," National Review, August 10,2004.
70 Soney Cagaptay, "Hamas Visits Ankara: The AKP Shifts Turkey's Role in the Middle East," PolicyWatch, Washington Institute for Near East Policies, no. 1081, February 16, 2006.
71 Kosebalaban, "Turkey's EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures," 131.
72 Hasan Pulur, "Tiirkiye'de Turkiye'yi Amerika'ya ~ikayet," Milliyet, February 10, 1999.
73 Dogu Peringek, "Ab'yeerefli Girine Demek?" Aydmhk, March 10,2002.
74 Ya‘ar BUyUkamt, "Kiiresel1e~me ve Uluslararasl GUvenlik," (Globalization and International Security), (Ankara: Genel Kurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etut Bakanhgl Yaymlan, 2003), quoted and translated by Yavuz and Ozcan, "The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party," 112.
75 "Ab Hlristiyan Kulubu," Radikal, January 14,2001.
76 "A General Speak His Mind," The Economist, March 14,2002.
77 Reprinted in Turhan Selauk, Karikaturun Notu, Cumhuriyet, April 25, 2006.
78 In the pre-Islamic Turkish nationalist discourse, pig was a symbol of settled and urban China, the Other of pre-Islamic Central Asian Turks. Turks despised pigs, as unlike lamb, they were not suitable to their nomadic life-style. See Emre Akoz, "Turhan Selcyuk'un Niyeti Ne?," Sabah, April 24, 2006.
79 Turhan Sehuk, "Karikaturiin Notu," Cumhuriyet, April 25, 2006.
80 Ertugrul Ozkok, "Son Paragrafa Dikkat," Hiirriyet, May 9, 2006.
81 Hasan Cemal, interview by Naki Ozkan, "Selcyuk Facist Bir Rejimi Savunuyor," Milliyet, December 4,2005. Also Hasan Cernal, Cumhuriyet'i (:ok Sevmi#im (Istanbul: Dogan, 2005).
82 Ali Sirmen, "Klblesi Washington Olan Islamclhk," Cumhuriyet, March 02, 2004.
83 1960 coup remains to be the favorite coup of the leftistlKemalist intellectuals. See Alev Co‘kun, 27 MaYls, 12 Mart, 12 Eyllil, 28 ~ubat Ko~uIlaf1, yaplh~larl ve Sonucylan Aym Degildir." Cumhuriyet, May 27, 2006. According to the author, the 1960 coup was revolutionary, the 1971 coup by memorandum conservative, the 1980 coup counterrevolutionary and the 28 February process progressive. While the author, as typical with the leftist lKemalist discourse, highlights the role of the United States in the 1980 coup, there is no single reference to the same in the 1960 coup.
84 Tanil Bora, "Nationalist Discourses in Turkey," South Atlantic Quarterly 102 (2003): 443.
85 "Rp'den AKP'ye Kabul Degi~tiren Tiirkiye," Radikal, June 13-15,2006.
86 Interview by Ne‘e Diizel,Radikal, February 27,2006.
87 Cemal Kalyoncu, "Kod Adl Osman Ogretmen," Aksiyon, December 2,2000.
88 Cengiz Candar, "Miisliimanlarm Moral Aymazl," Yeni $afak, September 21,2001.
Also "11 Eyllil, Tiirkiye, Miisliimanlar," Yeni $afak, September 27,2001.
89 Ahmet Tagetiren, "Bizim Amerikahlar," Yeni $afak, September 27,2001.
90 See for instance, "Akp'nin Abd Politikasl Nedir?" Hiirriyet, February 19,2005. "Tuurk-Abdili‘kileri," Hiirriyet, January 13, 2005.
91 "Tiirkiye-ABD ili~kileri," Hiirriyet, May 18-19,2005. Also "Bir Diplomat Portresi Osman Korutiirk," Hiirriyet, October 9,2005; "George W. Bush: Ortadogu icyin Tarihi Bir Kon~ma," Hiirriyet, July 1,2004.
92 "Cin Tehdidine Karl Tedbir Almak Zorundaylz," Hiirriyet, May 4,2005.
93 Interview
by Nee Diizel, "Kuzey Irak Tiirkiye'ye Baglanacak," Radikal, July 7, 2006.
94 "Olgulan Biitlin Okumak, Kana Koyii Ornegi," Hiirriyet, August 1, 2006.
